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much less problematic; yet even that may carry with it a human
cost that is ethically problematic.
While each case must be weighed separately, it seems to me that
there is little in favor of long term restriction to access. The Dead
Sea Scrolls are an excellent example of the problems that can arise
from that approach. Short term restrictions should be spelled out;
sometimes they are only fair. And, of course, one must differentiate between access— the right to see materials—and publication of
those materials. Access can guide a scholar's thinking without
breaching some other scholar's rights to publish. Even the rights
to publication should be short term. For example, in the field of
Greek papyrology, scholars usually receive the rights to a text for
a period of five years. During that time, they are assured that no
one will steal their thunder. If they make a discovery, they will
rightly receive credit. But after five years, their text reverts
to public domain. I would urge archivists not to accept donor
restrictions that depart from this general spirit. One must weigh the
rights of individual scholars together with those of his or her field
as a whole. If these rights conflict, those of the whole must always
take precedence. Speaking as a Dead Sea Scrolls scholar, that is
the best ethical advise I can give. Presumably this is not new
advice, but as fragile ethical beings it seems to me that it is often
necessary to remind ourselves of what we already know.
—Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations
University of Chicago

Comments on John K. Hord's "CIVILIZATION: A DEFINITION:
PART II. THE NATURE OF FORMAL KNOWLEDGE SYSTEMS"
David Richardson
I liked the second section of Hord's essay (Comparative Civilizations Review, 26, Spring 1992). His definition of the "core" of a
civilization, namely "formal knowledge system" has features that
particularly overlap with features of my worldview theory, with my
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ideas of Greek and Faustian II worldview-intuitions. For Hord,
formal knowledge systems of all kinds exist: Christianity, mathematics, empirical science, the Chinese worldview, the prehistoric
Mississippians ... and even low cultures: "a formal knowledge
system must have room for low culture, even if disdainful of it and
for high culture however evanescent its fashions." (131)
The flaws in Hord's theory are as follows: the core of civilization, its formal knowledge system, is exclusively conscious.
"'Knowledge,'" writes Hord, "will refer simply to 'data held to be
sufficiently factual as to constitute a valid basis for action.'" But
this statement is brushing aside the all-important unconscious
existence of the core-ingredients of a civilization.
Hord also unnecessarily limits the core, the "covenant," of a
civilization to beliefs, which are a type of knowledge. And which
is imperfect because unprovable. Since, for Hord, the core or
covenant is a matrix of beliefs, it is directly accessible to reason.
But Hord ignores feelings or emotions at the core of a civilization,
which are not a type of knowledge at all. And even the perceptions
at the center of a civilization include important irrational intuitions
and sensations that Hord does not write of. The vivid emotions of
abstract expressionist painters, and the great propensity of Arabians
or Muslims for sensational experience cannot be explained by
Hord's paradigm of a "formal knowledge system" arising out of a
core of beliefs.
Though Hord assumes that the governing mental state of civilized
people is rational and conscious, one does not adhere to the
"covenant" or "core" of a civilization by rational knowledge, but
only by belief. "The defining quality of these core beliefs are
solely that they are accepted without question and that their
acceptance is shared by essentially all members of the civilization.
When the beliefs cease to be thus shared, the formal knowledge
system ... [and] the society is failing ..." (122).
Hord and I are in agreement that comparative civilizational
studies should be scientific and rational, and like him I find that I
have to be an historian in order to proceed. I think that one who
would get at the core of civilizations has no choice but to be an
historian. Hord is not in this work a sociologist, and I am not a
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol28/iss28/10
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philosopher. To proceed, he or I must produce science and yet be
an historian.
The reason why Hord's model of the core is too rational is that
his paradigm is not getting at the worldview-intuitions of a
civilization, including shared intuitions:
some of which are
unconscious reasonings, some of which are unconscious feelings,
and some of which that are unconscious sensations. All of these
intuitions are present in the core of a civilization. I refer the reader
to C. G. Jung's four psychological types: Reason, Feeling,
Sensation, and Intuition.
The lacuna in Hord's idea of the core-covenant, lying at the
center of a knowledge system, leads to an error which is perhaps
the central misjudgment that comparative civilizationists have been
making in the past generation. The model of a rational and
conscious system of knowledge is excellent as far as it goes. The
trouble is, such a system is common to an immense number of
social entities, ranging from social clubs, to city-states, to portauthorities, to scientific organizations, to nations, empire,
hegemons, amphyctionies, and ... civilizations.
The outstandingly special qualities that only higher civilizations
have, as determined by the worldview-intuitions of their educated
citizens, tend to fade in this atmosphere, their vividness replaced by
uniformity of approach. But there is something astonishing and
wonderful to behold in the unfolding of the Greek worldview taking
shape in Confucius' age, and in the phenomenon of the Faustian
worldview becoming viable and practical between the two Bacons.
These are histories, or psychohistories, which will be worth
studying for their own sake.
It would be unfair to close without paying respects to Hord's
schemata: of covenant mediated by Law, which itself is mediated
by Procedure, and this mediated by Myth. I agree with him that
myth is absolutely essential to a civilization.
—Charlotte, North Carolina
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